








































natives,	 see	 Kristán	 Kristjánsson,	 Justifying	



























2. what is a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions?
One	 starting	point	 for	understanding	 the	claims	which	unite	 cognitivists	 is	
an	opposition	to	what	has	been	called	‘primitivism’	(Solomon	2004,	p.	76).	
This	position	holds	 that	emotions	are	 identical	with	physiological	 states	or	
feelings.	Perhaps	the	best	known	feeling	theory	which	has	provided	most	cog-












ers	 have	 done	 and	 are	 doing,	 but	 I	 am	 interested,	 to	 put	 it	 polemically,	 in	
processes that last more than five minutes and have the potential to last five 





























I	 take	 this	 sort	 of	 outline	 to	 be	 one	which	 virtually	 any	 cognitivist	would	














































































































































tionary	 standpoint,	 see:	Dylan	Evans,	 “Why	
Spock	could	never	have	Evolved”,	 in:	Emo-


























































I  have  claimed  that  some  of  the  criticism  levelled  at  cognitivism  is  there-
fore	not	valid	for	those	theorists	who	distance	themselves	from	the	view	that	


























































upon by  the other dimensions of  the construal and  thus  the active concern 
is	one	of	 the	 concerns	of	 the	 construal.	Thus	 fear,	 for	 example,	 is	not	 just	


























with	 emotions,	 such	as	our	knees	 shaking	or	our	 stomach	churning.	Many	





A	 further	 problem	 concerning	Roberts’	 theory	 is	whether	 or	 not	 he	 is	 try-
ing	to	squeeze	too	much	out	of	our	concept	of	perception	in	order	to	be	able	
to	account	for	the	very	wide	range	of	creatures	which	can	experience	emo-


































The  additional  key  claim  is  that  despite  his  rejection  of  the  importance  of 
feelings	in	his	earlier	work	(eg	1980,	p.	274),	he	has	come	to	the	view	that	
feelings	 are	 indeed	necessary	 for	 the	 experiencing	of	 an	 emotion.	But	 this	
does nothing to damage that claim that judgements are the key concept for 
understanding	 the	nature	of	emotion,	 in	 that	 the	kinds	of	 feelings	 involved	



























concept	 of	 psychic	 feelings,	 see	 his	Valuing	
Emotions	 with	 Elizabeth	 Hegeman	 (Cam-































































































7. A way Forward
My claim is that the cognitivist approach to the nature of emotion is essen-
tially	right,	and	that	what	is	required	is	not	pulling	down	the	house,	but	simply	









Robert	 C.	 Solomon,	 “What	 is	 a	 Cognitive	
Theory	of	the	Emotions?”,	in:	Anthony	Hatzi-




Heidegger’s	 discussion	 of	 ‘mood’	 comes	
principally	in	Division	I,	Section	V	of	Being	
and	Time,	Blackwell,	Oxford	1962.	Merleau-














































failure,	 and	a	 feeling	of	her	heart	pounding.	The	 fact	 that	 each	experience	


















terms,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 difficulty	which	has	 led	 at	 least	 one	major	 contempo-
rary theorist to argue that the concept could usefully be abandoned altogether 




























phenomenal	 feel.	The	 problem	 this	 generates	 is	 that	we	 commonly	 distin-





































this	 conclusion	 receives	 support	 from	 the	 second	problem	with	Prinz’s	 ac-
count.	He	has	acknowledged	that	different	emotions	have	similar	bodily	re-
sponses,	but	we	can	tell	we	are	feeling	guilty	rather	than	sad.	His	explanation	


























states	which	 constitute	 this	 intentional	 aspect.	 It	 is	when	 such	 intentional	
states	 are	 combined	 in	 consciousness	with	 another	 category	of	 intentional	
state,	feelings,	that	we	are	experiencing	an	emotion.	But	this	leads	to	another	
























and	come	 to	be	directed	 towards	certain	 specific	objects	of	my	 intentional	
states,	which	are	also	the	intentional	object	of	my	emotions.
Prinz	 is	 right	 to	 think	of	feelings	as	having	intentionality,	but	as	should	be	
clear	from	what	I	have	already	said,	I	suggest	he	has	got	the	intentional	ob-
jects	of	feelings	wrong.	Feelings	are	perceptions,	and	the	intentional	objects	
of	 the	 feelings	 involved	 in	emotions	are	 states	of	one’s	body,	or	of	mental	
states.11 The phenomenology of our emotions means that the disparate parts 






















merely	 to	 suggest	 that	we	often	draw	a	dis-
tinction	 between	 perception	 of	 non-mental	
states  on  the  one  hand  such  our  a  lump  in 






to  look  at  the  evolutionary  development  of 





differing	 sorts	 of	 perceptions	 involved	 in	 emotions,	 including	 the	 relevant	
feelings.







feelings’	 (Damasio	1995),	 ‘feeling	 towards’	 (Goldie	2000),	and	‘existential	




















sentially  right. This can be seen more  readily once one  recognises  that  the 












































































Emocija, kognicija i osjećaj
Sažetak
Tekst propituje novija istraživanja i razvoj kognitivnih teorija emocija te nastoji razviti origi-
nalnu	teoriju	unutar	tog	pristupa.		Tekst	se	posebno	usmjerava	na	kriticizam	koji	takve	teorije	
pre-intelektualiziranih emocija reducira na stavove prema propozicijama i isključuje osjećaje. 
Tvrdim da je svega nekoliko kognitivista zastupalo navedenu teoriju te da je moguće tvrditi 
da su emocije djelomično konstituirane od osjećaja i da ostaju unutar parametara kognitivne 
teorije. To je moguće ako je valjana činjenica da kognitivisti smatraju da su emocije sastavljene 
od intencionalnih stavova. Ako definiramo osjećaj kao percepciju stava o nečijem tijelu, tada 
se osjećaj može razumjeti kao jedan od intencionalnih stavova uz, primjerice, uvjerenje o moći 



































attitude	envers	 le	 corps	de	quelqu’un,	alors	on	peut	 entendre	 le	 sentiment	 comme	 l’une	des	
attitudes	intentionnelles,	tout	comme	la	conviction	de	discernement	qui	constitue	partiellement	
toute	émotion.	Je	nomme	cette	position	le	«	cognitivisme	complexe	».
Mots-clés
émotion,	cognitivisme,	sentiment,	jugement,	perception
